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Abstract: One of the problems modern theories of risk have to cope with is the variety of 
approaches to the subject. While the interest in solutions for applied fields like risk 
management and financial mathematics in general increased during the last years due to 
systems of regulations like Basel II and Solvency, particular problems were discussed 
employing mathematical approaches since the 16
th century. The variety of the particular 
problems investigated and the multitude of perspectives and interests in the related 
formulations of the questions lead to miscellaneous approaches during the centuries. These 
were the more or the less applicable to specific problems under consideration and had to be 
completed and supplemented and often additional aspects were added. 
The multitude of isolated considerations and solutions of problems connected with the notion 
of risk led to a development of many single and equally isolated approaches and nowadays 
there is still no conclusive and integrated theory of risk in sight. 
The paper will focus on the early texts of Galileo Galilei (1613~1623) and Daniel Bernoulli 
(1738) as examples of pure combinatorical analysis and perspectively considerations within 
the mathematical discipline of probability theory. It is argued that Bernoulli's approach 
needed to be developed further in order to achieve a successful and satisfactory theory of risk. 
In modern economy the need for a proper definition of a notion of risk is seen and currently 
discussed within the frame of ISO standards. But as already mentioned this interest is mainly 
owed to the governmental demands of the Basel II and Solvency standards and therefore an 
external demand. On the other hand an intrinsic understanding of the meaning of risk, as 
could be provided by a conclusive theory, could lead to a better success in modelling various 
risks and help to achieve better prognosis.Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 2
Introduction
In ancient times, few people could understand even the simplest  arithmetic and geometry, 
and the confusion of mathematics with  magic has a long history.
People who had knowledge of the regular movements of the heavens  were able to predict the 
position of planets, and the particular the  times when astronomical events appeared in certain 
sections of  the sky. 
In Europe, after the arrival of Christianity, the religious aspect of these  practices was 
condemned as superstition. Because numbers were  used in these processes, anyone who used 
numbers was  regarded with considerable suspicion. A contemporary quote of St. Augustine 
of Hippo (354-430 CE), an early christian bishop, reads: 
"The good Christian should beware of mathematicians and all those who make empty 
prophecies. The danger already exists that mathematicians have made a covenant with 
the devil to darken the spirit and confine man in the bonds of Hell." 
As the predictive power of astronomy and other practical uses of mathematics became 
apparent, mathematicians were able to dispel the idea that many events were not controlled by 
the goddess Fortuna, but could be explained in a rational way. It is a historical fact, that the 
beginnings of probability theory are connected with dice. Dice were used in gambling, in 
religious ceremonies and for divination. And I will start this considerations by scetching this 
tradition.
Probabilities and dice
The first document showing the possibilities with three dice was the Latin poem De Vetula , 
which shows all the combinations for the fall of three dice, and is believed to have been 
written in the early 13th century. 
Later Dante refered to a game played with three dice in his Divina Comedia:
"Quando si parte il giuoco della zara
Colui che perde si riman dolente,
Repetendo le volte, e tristo impara;
Con l’altro se ne va tutta la gente;
Qual va dinnanzi, e qual di dietro il prende,
E qual da lato li si reca a mente.
Ei non s’arresta, e questo e quello intende;
A cui porge la man, più non fa pressa;
E così dalla calca si difende."
1
1 English translation: „WHENE'ER is broken up the game of Zara, 
He who has lost remains behind despondent, 
The throws repeating, and in sadness learns; 
The people with the other all depart; One goes in front, and one behind doth pluck 
And at his side one brings himself to mind;
He pauses not, and this and that one hears; 
They crowd no more to whom his hand he stretches, 
And from the throng he thus defends“ (Dante Divina Comedia [Pur, VI, 1-12])Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 3
Another twohundred years later Cardano (1501-1576) turned to the topic. He was writing with 
considerable personal knowledge of gambling. And it was him who recognised that if the die 
was honest, each face would have an equal chance of appearing. His Liber De Ludo Aleae 
was written about 1526 but only found after his death, and not published until 1663. He gave 
tables of the results for one, two and three dice, but these are not all correct. 
Galilei's consideration of dice
Galileo (1564 - 1642) wrote on probability but his work was not published until 1718. He 
stated that with three dice there can only be one way of obtaining a 3 (1,1,1) and an 18 (6,6,6) 
but there are three ways of obtaining a 6, and four ways for a 7.
The manuscript was found without a title. The titles known today were given by the editors. 
One can find "Considerazione sopra il gioco dei dadi" (1718) as well as "Sopra le scoperte dei 
dadi".
2
The problem Galilei solved was stated by a nobleman, as can be deduced from the text. But it 
seems clear, that it was his employer Cosimo II de' Medici, Duke of Tuscany. Therefore the 
paper can be dated as of 1610-1621. Cosimo II. de’ Medici (1590-1621) was the Grandduke 
of Tuscany since 1608. In autumn 1610 Galilei was appointed mathematician of the court.
The fact that in a dice-game certain numbers are more advantageous than others has a very 
obvious reason, i.e. that some are more easily and more frequently made than others, which 
depends on their being able to be made up with more variety of numbers. Thus a 3 and an 18, 
which are throws which can only be made in one way with 3 numbers (that is, the latter with 
6.6.6 and the former with 1.1.1, and in no other way), are more difficult to make than, e.g. 6 
or 7, which can be made up in several ways:
6 can be achieved by 3 different combinations 
7 can be achieved by 4 different combinations
Therefore the output 7 should occur more often than 6.
One can easily convince oneself by simply counting the possible outcomes:
6 7
1.2.3 1.1.5
2.2.2 1.2.4
1.1.4 1.3.3
2.2.3
"Nevertheless, although 9 and 12 can be made up in as many ways as 10 and 11, and therefore 
they should be considered as being of equal utility to these, yet it is known that long 
observation has made dice-players consider 10 and 11 to be more advantageous than 9 and 12. 
And it is clear that 9 and 10 can be made up by an equal diversity of numbers, [...] which are 
six triple numbers, [...], and in no other ways, and these also are six combinations."
3
2 Title given by Favaro in the Edizione Nazionale, vol. 8
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9 10
1.2.6 1.3.6
1.3.5 1.4.5
1.4.4 2.2.6
2.2.5 2.3.5
2.3.4 2.4.4
3.3.3 3.3.4
Galilei hopes to open the way to a precise understanding of the reasons for which all the 
details of the game have been with great care and judgement arranged and adjusted. His 
analysis reads: 
„Three special points must be noted for a clear understanding of what follows. The first 
is that that sum of the points of 3 dice, which is composed of 3 equal numbers, can only 
be produced by one single throw of the dice: and thus a 3 can only be produced by the 
three ace-faces, and a 6, if it is to be made up of 3 twos, can only be made by a single 
throw.”
Therefore Galilei's conclusion is: here exists only 1 partition. Accordingly 4 and 8 can be 
composed by 3 partitions, namely
4 = (2.1.1), (1.2.1), (1.1.2)
and
8 = (2.2.3), (3.2.3), (3.3.2).
4
In general each partition of 3 distinct numbers can be made of 6 permutations. The 
combinations for 8 are still considered as an example, using the partition 1.3.4:
8 = (1.3.4), (1.4.3), (3.1.4), (4.1.3), (3.4.1), (4.3.1).
5
Galilei sums up his findings: 
4 In Galilei's words this reads: "Secondly: the sum which is made up of 3 numbers, of which two are the same 
and the third different, can be produced by three throws: as e.g., a 4 which is made up of a 2 and of two aces, 
can be produced by three different throws; that is, when the first die shows 2 and the second and third show 
the ace, or the second die a 2 and the first and third the ace; or the third a 2 and the first and second the ace. 
And so e.g., an 8, when it is made up of 3.3.2, can be produced also in three ways: i.e. when the first die 
shows 2 and the others 3 each, or when the second die shows 2 and the first and third 3, or finally when the 
third shows 2 and the first and second 3."
5 Galilei writes: "Thirdly the sum of points which is made up of three different numbers can be produced in six 
ways. As for example, an 8 which is made up of 1.3.4. can be made with six different throws: first, when the 
first die shows 1, the second 3 and the third 4; second, when the first die still shows 1, but the second 4 and 
the third 3; third, when the second die shows 1, and the first 3 and the third 4; fourth, when the second still 
shows 1, and the first 4 and the third 3; fifth, when the third die shows 1, the first 3, and the second 4; sixth, 
when the third shows 1, the first 4 and the second 3."Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 5
1. triples, that is the sum of three-dice throws, which are made up of three equal 
numbers, can only be produced in one way
2. that the triples which are made up of two equal numbers and the third different, are 
produced in three ways
3. that those triples which are made up of three different numbers are produced in six 
ways
His final result is given by the table:
This table gives indeed the correct results and it makes Cosimo's problem comprehensible. 
The comprehension is not only achieved by counting the possible outcomes, but Galilei shows 
how one can thoroughly analyse complex systems which may be not overlooked at a first 
glance. His text was a large step towards theoretical analysis of complex systems, as it 
showed how to analyse risks and chances in formerly unknown or less understood systems. 
Therefore Galilei's paper marks the dawn of a theory of probability and decision theory.
He shows that it is most important to discern between questions of different types. In the 
example one has to deal with three levels. These are:
• Level 1: event of interest: outcome if you throw 3 dice
• Level 2: event (at medium level): partition
• Level 3: elementary event (sub-structure): permutation
Ian Hacking in his book on probability (1975/2006)
6 makes two important observations on 
this:
 
"In case the probabilities of compound outcomes with dice should now be so well 
established as to seem a priori, it may be useful to update the example. Consider 
elementary particles of microphysics. The natural generalization of dice takes r dice 
with n faces, thus giving n' equiprobable alternatives."
Therefore one has the problem of the distribution of r objects into n cells, but this is related to 
one of the particle statistics in physics:
"This is called the Maxwell-Boltzmann system. So far as is known, no particles obey 
the Maxwell-Boltzmann laws, which apply to indistinguishable particles. If however we 
consider that arrangements of particles are indistinguishable, we get the Bose-Einstein 
6 Ian Hacking 1975/2006: Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 6
statistics. If we add the further condition that it is impossible for two or more particles 
to be in the same cell, and assign equal probability to all arrangements satisfying that 
condition we get the Fermi-Dirac statistics."
7
Hacking comments further on the relation to modern particle statistics and connects this to 
Leibniz
8:
"It is an empirical fact that photons obey the Bose-Einstein statistics, electrons obey the 
Fermi-Dirac statistics, and dice obey the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics. Leibniz once 
made the mistake of supposing that with dice partitions (rather than permutations) form 
the Fundamental Probability Set of equal alternatives. That is, he accepted the Bose-
Einstein statistics for dice!"
9
Galilei's conclusion and the solution of Cosimo's problem was: If permutations are equally 
probable, the 11 is more advantageous than 12 in the ratio 27:25. It is also agreed by Hacking, 
that this is one of the first examples in history where a statistical proof is given by long term 
observations.
It should be observed that Leibniz had metaphysical problems with the concept of 
indiscernibility and therefore supposed that all kinds of particles should stay within the 
classical domain. He uses properties like those of the Fermi-Dirac statistics to disprove the 
existence of 'particles' obeying this in several passages where he is dealing with the concept of 
indiscernibility.
10
Further Galilei almost 'invented' the concept of 'long term observation' and refers to it in 
several places, e.g. in his "Discorsi" where he claims that he performed his experiment 
proofing the independence of mass in free fall "more than one hundred times" at the tower of 
Pisa.
11
Finally the difference between 9 and 10 (3 dice experiment) is in terms of probability (25/216) 
to (27/216), which is even in long terms difficult to observe. Although this may be possible, 
indeed.
Bernoulli's Specimen Theoriae Novae
The other important step towards a theory of risks, I want to mention, was taken 1738 by 
Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782)  in his analysis of a problem posed by his cousin Nicolaus 
Bernoulli in 1713.
12
At the beginning of the paper Bernoulli states, that all mathematicians who had studied the 
measurement of risk agree, that:
7 Ian Hacking 1975/2006:
8 The problem is connected to Leibniz's philosophy through the notion of indiscernibility. For details see 
Linhard 2000, pp.155-201.
9 Ian Hacking 1975/2006 pp.51-52.
10 Frank Linhard 2000 and Frank Linhard 2008.
11 Everybody who climbed the Pisa tower (when this was still possible) will agree that this claim of Galilei is in 
doubt. He most probably did not try his experiment with free fall for more than 100 times.
12 Daniel Bernoulli: "Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis", 1738, Commentarii Academiae 
Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae., (trans. in 1954, Econometrica, Vol. 22, No.1, p.23-36).Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 7
"Expected values are computed by multiplying each possible gain by the number of 
ways in which it can occur, and then dividing the sum of these products by the total 
number of cases where, in this theory, the consideration of cases which are all of the 
same probability is insisted upon."
and that:
"If this rule be accepted, what remains to be done within the framework of this theory 
amounts to the enumeration of all alternatives, their breakdown into equi-probable cases 
and, finally, their insertion into corresponding classifications."
13
Expected values are computed by multiplying each possible gain by the number of ways in 
which it can occur, and then dividing the sum of these products by the total number of cases. 
It is supposed that the cases are all of the same probability.
 
If X is a discrete random variable with probability mass function p(x), the expected value 
becomes E(X). Be f(x) the probability mass function of X, the outcome of a single coin toss, 
assigning 0 to tails and 1 to heads. The probability that X = x is 0.5 on the state space {0, 1}.
Before Bernoulli turns to the famous Petersburg Paradox, he starts with an observation from 
the multiple publications on the topic, all claiming that: "since there is no reason to assume 
that of two persons encountering identical risks, either should expect to have his desires more 
closely fulfilled, the risks anticipated by each must be deemed equal in value."
This is a formulation of the principle of sufficient reason. 
He further tries to formulate the problem in general terms by stripping individual 
characteristics of the persons themselves and banning them from the consideration; only those 
matters should be weighed carefully that pertain to the terms of the risk. Using this method he 
prepares the topic for a theoretical approach.
In §3 he introduces his kind of problem by an example: 
"Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield with equal 
probability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats. Will this man evaluate his chance 
of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would he not be ill-advised to sell this lottery ticket 
for nine thousand ducats? To me it seems that the answer is in the negative. On the other 
hand I am inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to refuse to buy the 
lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats. If I am not wrong then it seems clear that all men 
cannot use the same rule to evaluate the gamble."
14
The rule established in §1 must, therefore, be discarded. But anyone who considers the 
problem with perspicacity and interest will ascertain that the concepts of value which we have 
used in this rule may be defined in a way which renders the entire procedure universally 
acceptable without reservation. To do this the determination of the value of an item must not 
be based on its price, but rather on the utility it yields. 
13 Bernoulli §1.
14 Bernoulli §3.Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 8
Bernoulli deduces from his concept of utility a fundamental rule which he gives in §4: If the 
utility of each possible profit expectation is multiplied by the number of ways in which it can 
occur, and we then divide the sum of these products by the total number of possible cases, a 
mean utility [moral expectation] will be obtained, and the profit which corresponds to this 
utility will equal the value of the risk in question.
For Bernoulli it becomes evident that no valid measurement of the value of a risk can be 
obtained without consideration being given to its utility, that is to say, the utility of whatever 
gain accrues to the individual or, conversely, how much profit is required to yield a given 
utility. However, it hardly seems plausibly to make any precise generalizations since the 
utility of an item may change with circumstances.
15
The question if this kind of problem is accessible to mathematics was answered by Bernoulli 
with: yes. He claims "Now it is highly probably that any increase in wealth, no matter how 
insignificant, will always result in an increase in utility which is inversely proportional to the 
quantity of goods already possessed."
16
This is the first published exposition of the Principle of Decreasing Marginal utility. This 
principle, later widely accepted in the theory of economic behavior, states that marginal utility 
(the extra utility obtained from consuming a good) decreases as the quantity consumed 
increases; in other words, that each additional good consumed is less satisfying than the 
previous one. 
The St. Petersburg paradox
The reason why Bernoulli's paper became famous is the St. Petersburg Paradox. It is 
introduced in the following example: A fair coin will be tossed until a head appears; if the 
first head appears on the nth toss, then the payoff is 2 nducats. How much should one pay to 
play this game? The paradox is that the expected return is infinite, namely: 
 
E(w) = (1/2)·2 + (1/4)22 + (1/8)23 + .... = 1 + 1 + 1 + ..... = infinite
 
(calculated by the Definition of §1)
Yet while the expected payoff is infinite, one would not suppose, at least intuitively, that real-
world people would be willing to pay an infinite amount of money to play this.
 
The problem was posed by Nicolaus Bernoulli in 1713 and already discussed by the 
mathematician Gabriel Cramer, who gave Bernoulli's solution in a letter to Nicolaus in 1728. 
Daniel Bernoulli's solution involved two ideas that have since revolutionized economics: 
firstly, that people's utility from wealth u(w), is not linearly related to wealth w but rather 
increases at a decreasing rate - the famous idea of diminishing marginal utility; 
secondly that a person's valuation of a risky venture is not the expected return of that venture, 
but rather the expected utility from that venture. 
15 Bernoulli §5.
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In the St. Petersburg case, the value of the game to an agent (assuming initial wealth is zero) 
is:
E(u) = (1/2)·u(2) + (1/4)·u(22) + (1/8)·u(23) + .... < infinite
which Bernoulli conjectured is finite because of the principle of diminishing marginal utility. 
(Bernoulli originally used a logarithmic function of the type u(x) = a log x). Consequently, 
people would only be willing to pay a finite amount of money to play this, even though its 
expected return is infinite. 
In general, by Bernoulli's logic, the valuation of any risky venture takes the expected utility 
form:
 
E(u | p, X) = ∑x p(x)u(x)
where X is the set of possible outcomes, p(x) is the probability of a particular outcome x Î X 
and u: X → R is a utility function over outcomes. 
The St. Petersburg game offers the possibility of huge prizes. A run of forty would, for 
example, pay a whopping €1.1 trillion. Of course, this prize happens rarely: only once in 
about 1.1 trillion times. Half the time, the game pays only €2, and you're 75% likely to wind 
up with a payment of €4 or less. Your chances of getting more than €20 (the entry price which 
had suggested is a reasonable maximum) are less than one in 20. Very low payments are very 
probable, and very high ones very rare. It's a foolish risk to invest more than €20 to play. 
It was argued that this sort of consideration in fact solves the St. Petersburg paradox. 
Complicated ways were offered of including a risk-aversion factor in calculations of expected 
utility, with the result that there is a finite upper limit to the rational entrance fee for the game. 
The inclusion of a risk-aversion factor is as artificial as Bernoulli's original logarithmic 
function, to get an upper bound.
On the other hand Bernoulli's principle of decreasing marginal utility was widely accepted 
within economic theory.
 
The problem already in Bernoulli's approach seems that the way to deal with the paradox in 
mathematical terms is entirely ad hoc. Bernoulli introduced a logarithmic function to gain 
some kind of artificial cut-off. But why is the function logarithmic? It simply serves the 
purpose of the fast cut-off he wants to have. 
And here is also the main difference between Galilei's solution of a former not entirely 
understood problem and Bernoulli's observation that a mathematical description may not 
always picture the aspects of a system that are of special interest to man. While Galilei had to 
complete an uncomplete analysis to give the proper mathematics for three dice – which may 
even be used to model any problem, Bernoulli has to introduce additional aspects to take care 
of human interest in his model of a system. Therefore he is not improving an existing 
mathematical model, but he shows that a model does not deal with important aspects currently 
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Both approaches are pivotal for the development of an integrated theory of risk. First, one 
needs a thorough analysis of the system under consideration, second, one needs mathematical 
descriptions of aspects that are important or interesting to humans.
Historical Summary
Here I will shortly sketch the historical steps the analysis of risks took during the last 
centuries. This is illustrated by some drawings.
Situation before Cosimo: The system you bet on is a black box:
Situation at the time of Cosimo: The system you bet on is only rudimentary analysed:Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 11
Situation at the time of Cosimo with Galilei's help: The system you bet on is thoroughly 
analysed:
Situation now: The system you bet on is not thoroughly analysed.
This means that we are somehow close to the situation at the time of Galilei. Although there is 
considerable interest in the problem, because of regulations given by the state (government) 
like BASEL II or Solvency, there are only "island and solitary solutions" and no conclusive 
theory. In the final section I will try to sketch a possible solution.
Conclusion and solutions
The notion of risk has always a personal component, as was already observed by Bernoulli. 
Furthermore the notion of risk has a temporal component. Something is always at risk for a 
certain time and sooner or later the risk is realised or not. Therefore there is no risk in the past. 
Things that have already happened in a certain way cannot be considered in terms of risk. On 
the other hand the temporary component is of great importance in any description of a system 
which is actually at risk. The observer wants to know every risk at every instant of time.
A theory of risk has always to deal with complex systems and to take care of a multitude of 
constraints and boundary conditions. One of the main problems is that not all the risks in a 
system or all the risks thereatening a system can be identified properly. Modern risk 
management deals with this problems by so called risk assessments, where experts are 
expected to identify certain types of risks. After the risks are identified, experts try to model 
them with mathematical tools. 
The problems of this approach are evident: Not all the risks can be identified and not all the 
identified risks are modelled properly. The reasons for this are multifarious. One problem is a 
lack of time and the improper analysis of already identified risks. So Galilei's approach is still 
worthwile. Another point is the mathematical modelling of man's needs and this corresponds Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 12
to the historical example of Bernoulli. It is important to find a regulator for mathematical ad 
hoc implementations into theories.
To deal with this I propose a modelling method already successful in many-particle physics, 
where one takes care of unknown interactions by an effective potential and where it is 
formally supposed that these interactions are known. This approach was elaborated already in 
the 1960s in what is now called Density-Functional-Theory, and the formal fundamentals 
were laid by Hohenberg and Kohn.
17  The method was very successful in atomic physics and 
theoretical chemistry, as it allows comparably easily for numerical modelling. Especially the 
Kohn-Sham theory has to be mentioned in this context, because it provides differential 
equations that can be solved in a self-consistent manner.
18
As a conclusion of this paper I will give a short sketch how to deal with the modelling of 
systems by effective potentials, using a symbolic notation. 
Ordinary risk theory deals with systems, their developments and risks by applying a matrix M 
on a state vector S. Here the components of the matrix M=mij picture development factors in 
general and risk factors in particular. As already mentioned the matrix M and the vector S 
have to be timedependent. If the matrix M is applied to the state vector S it results in the new 
vector S', giving the current state:
M S = S'
The first step is to show the equivalence of the matrix formulation with a wavefunction 
operator calculus. This equivalence should be expected in analogy to the formulations of 
quantum mechanics.
19 Call the “wavefunction” Φ and the potential which includes the system 
relevant operators V. This potential V should be set up as an effective potential as in many-
body theory, where the effective potential represents the complete surrounding and all other 
components relating to a single component. These single components are represented by their 
“single-component-wavefunction”. From Veff it is expected to separate some kind of kinetic 
operator taking care of the individual development of the components, which may be called T. 
Local properties of the environment of the system may be included in some potential Vloc, 
while a kind of component-component interaction may be given by the exchange potential 
Vcc. The exchange components not included in these spinoffs are included in some exchange-
correlation term Vxc. Therefore the formally complete effective potential is:
Veff = T +  Vcc  +  Vloc +  Vxc
The thus gained equations could be solved self-consistently, improving the value of the 
unknown exchange-correlation term Vxc. Of course the scheme is set up in analogy to Kohn-
Sham theory, but it may solve the problem if the following steps are taken:
1. The formal equivalence of the matrix calculus and the effective potential calculus has 
to be proven. In quantum mechanics it has not been a simple task to show that 
Heisenberg's matrix formalism was formally equivalent to Schrödinger's wave 
17 P. Hohenberg and W. Kohn: Inhomogeneous Electron Gas. Phys. Rev. 136 (1964) B864-B871 
18 W. Kohn and L. J. Sham, Phys.Rev. 140 (1965) A1133
19 Details on the historical development in quantum mechanics can be found in Carlos Madrid Casado: A brief 
history of the mathematical equivalence between the two quantum mechanics, Lat. Am. J. Phys. Educ. Vol. 2, 
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formalism. It was John von Neumann who finally could show that the Heisenberg and 
Schrödinger formalism are operator calculi on isomorphic (isometric) realizations of 
the same Hilbert space and hence equivalent formulations of one and the same 
conceptual substratum.
20 For the conclusive theory of risk something similar has to be 
shown.
2. Proper formulations of the component functions and of the potential parts for the 
kinetic term, the component-component interaction and the local potential have to be 
constructed and tested.
3. It is necessary to find an approximation for the exchange correlation term Vxc. To do 
the self-consistent calculations successfully it is important to have a realistic 
approximation for the exchange part. In many-particle physics so called local 
approximations proved to be successful. Here the exchange and correlation effects are 
modelled in a short range of the component and the close surrounding is generalised to 
form some global background. A formulation in terms of density seems to be 
promising for this task.
To set up a consistent integrated theory of risk, there is obviously still a long way to go – but 
there is a way.
20 For more details see  Madrid Casado 2008.Frank Linhard: Formal and non-formal approaches to the notion of "Risk" 14
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